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A B ST R A C T

Most empirical studies on migration are implicitly based on the assumption that there are
only comer solutions to the individual's migration-timing problem. A switch model, which
combines the concepts of expected earning differential, risk-bearing and assimilation costs,
indicates that comer solutions are adopted only when individuals perceive no risk differential
between the places of destination and origin, or when they have no time preference. In any
other case, individuals delay migration to future dates within their lifespan. Disregarding these
internal solutions understates the true number of migrants and hence leads to biased estimates of
the determinants of place-to-place current migration.

1
1.

INTRODUCTION
In his seminal article on labour migration and urban unemployment in less developed

countries Michael P. Todaro (1969) argues that rural to urban migration is triggered by the
discounted stream of expected real income differential over the lifespan between the place of
destination and the place of origin. This hypothesis has been tested in many empirical studies
including Greenwood's (1971, 1978) simultaneous equation analyses for India and Mexico,
and the more recent multinomial-logit analyses on Columbia (Fields, 1982), Venezuela
(Schultz, 1982) and Israel (Justman, Levy and Gabriel, 1988). In all these studies the analysis
is restricted to the individual's decision on migration at a given date and the amount of time of
migration is disregarded. Given that there is a sufficient incentive for migration, it is still
worthy to know when to migrate and what the gains, or losses, are from migrating at one point
of time as compared to another.
As will be shown in this paper, immediate migration or no migration during the entire
lifespan (i.e., comer solutions) are not the only possible solutions to the individual's migrationtiming decision problem. In many cases it is possible that the individual prefers to delay
migration to a future date in his/her planning period (i.e., interior solution). Disregarding the
interior solutions might lead to undesired properties of empirical analyses' findings. In
particular, the possibility of an interior solution to the migration-timing problem raises severe
doubts about the consistency of the estimated parameters of multinomial-logit analysis of
current place-to-place migration since these analyses are based on the assumption that the
individual's migration-timing problem can have only comer solutions. Moreover, optimal
timing of migration is an important factor for a successful migration. Sub-optimal timing might
lead to an unsuccessful migration and, perhaps, to a return to the place of origin.
The purpose of this paper is to analyse this issue of migration timing which is missing
in the migration literature. The paper utilises the concept of discounted stream of expected real
income differential suggested by Todaro (1969) as well as the important concepts of risk
differential between the origin and destination (Stark and Levhari, 1982) and costs of
assimilation (Chiswick, 1978) as building stones of a switch model that yields the individual's
optimal timing of migration. This switch model implies that comer solutions to the migration
timing problem, that is immediate migration or no migration during the lifetime, occur where
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the individual is either risk-neutral, perceives no income-variance differential, or has no time
preference. In other circumstances, the individual delays migration to a certain future date
within the planning horizon.
The switch model is developed in Section 2. The interior and comer solutions to the
migration timing problem are presented and discussed in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. The
analysis of the optimal timing of migration also leads to the distinction between various types of
migrants. Three general types of migrants are defined, and the characters of their migration
timing decisions are discussed in Section 5. Concluding remarks are made in Section 6.

2.

SWITCH MODEL
Although there is a debate in the economic literature on whether migration should be

viewed as permanent and irreversible (Marr, 1985) or temporary and reversible (Ethier, 1985),
we assume here that migration is irreversible. In support of this assumption we note that guest
workers in West-European countries, who arrived following the labour shortage created by the
economic boom of the late 1950s and the early 1960s, tend to remain despite the recession of
the 1970s. Moreover, in many cases returning to the place of origin is made impossible by
authorities, or is associated with admittance of a failure which individuals tend to avoid. Under
this simplifying assumption the present value (PV) of the individual's stream of real income
over his/her lifespan [0,T] can be presented as
t
T
PV(t) = Je-^yoxd t+ |e-^ y dxdT
0
t

(1)

where y0 and yd are random variables denoting the individual's real incomes in the place of
origin and in the place of destination, respectively; r the individual's rate of time preferences;
xe [0,T] a time index; and t the time of migration.
In view of Von Neuman-Morgenstem's axioms, the individual is taken as an expected
utility maximizer, and assuming for tractability that PV(t) is a Gaussian variate and that the
individual's preferences over the feasible set [PV(t) e R:0<t<T] are presented by a negative
exponential utility function reflecting constant absolute risk aversion, the migration date (t) is
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found by maximizing the mean of PV(t) minus the costs of risk-bearing which are equal to the
variance of PV(t) times the individual's degree of absolute risk aversion (R). That is,

max {E(PV(t)) - 0.5R var(PV(t))}.
t

(2)

(See Freund, 1956, for a rigorous development of the mean-variance expected utility function,
and Hammond, 1974, and Meyer, 1987, for a discussion of the generality of this framework.)
With regard to the stochastic nature of the individual's incomes we assume that the
incomes in the places of origin and destination are independently and normally distributed with
finite and constant variances o~ and o^, respectively; but while the mean income in the place
of origin (|lQ) is taken as time invariant, the mean income of the migrant in the place of
destination converges gradually to the mean income enjoyed by the host population (|i<i).
The difference between the mean incomes of host worker and migrant worker reflects
the assumed skill differential and the migrant's disadvantage in terms of location-specific
knowledge such as language, culture, prejudices, and understanding of local processes of job
search. We refer to this difference as costs of assimilation and let them take the mathematically
convenient form

C(t) - ce-P («)

(3)

where X-t is the time elapsed since migration, c indicates the initial costs of assimilation
(i.e., c = C(T=t)), and [3 the speed of assimilation. The initial costs of assimilation and the
speed of assimilation depend upon the migrant's suitability to the host-place's socioeconomic
conditions. The underlying rationale is that newcomers are initially disadvantaged, but as a
consequence of acquiring location-specific skills their wages "catch-up" with those of the host
population.

This rationale is supported by Chiswick's (1978) study on the effects of

Americanisation on the earnings of foreign-born people, and more recently by Chiswick and
Miller's (1985) findings on immigrant-host population wage differential in Australia with the
1981 census' data that "at the end of the first year of residence the overseas-born's income is

about 10.5 percent less than that of the native-born, and the gap narrows by 0.2 percentage
point per year", (p.545) Applying Borjas' (1985) technique of controlling between cohorts
effects to two sets of cross-section data on Australian native-born and immigrant earnings in
1973 and 1981, and distinguishing between immigrants from English-speaking countries and
immigrants from non-English speaking countries, Beggs and Chapman (1988) show that skills
acquired overseas are easily transferred between like countries but imperfectly transferrable to
dissimilar countries. In terms of the assimilation cost function specified above, these findings
indicate that c is small and P is significantly large for immigrants whose countries of origin and
destination have similar culture and language.
Under these assumptions and specifications the individual's income distribution is given
by:

(4)

hence

E(PV(t))

0

(5)
t

and

var(PV(t))

( 6)

0

t

Substituting equations (5) and (6) into equation (2) implies that the optimal time of migration is
found through
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The interior and corner solutions to this problem are presented and discussed in the next two
sections.

3.

INTERIOR SOLUTION TO THE MIGRATION TIMING PROBLEM
The necessary conditions for maximum expected utility is

= Mo - (Md - c) -0.5Re'rt* (o%. o j) -

[ i-e-(r+P)(T-t*)] = 0.

(9)

Given that (9) holds, the sufficient condition is given by

-0.5rR ( o j . o^)e'rt* +cpe-(r+PXT-t*) < 0 .

(10)

The necessary condition for maximum expected utility can be represented equally as

[(W -c)-M + - % l - e -(r+P)(T-t*)] =e-rt*0.5R(a2.cj2).
r+p

(11)

Since the second term on the left-hand side (LHS) of inequality (10) is positive, the sufficient
condition for maximum expected utility requires that the income in the place of destination
should be less certain than the income in the place of origin. Moreover, the discounted increase
in the assimilation costs from an infinitesimal delay of the migration time from the optimal date
should be smaller than the decrease in the costs of risk bearing. Given that the sufficient
condition is satisfied, there exists an interior solution to the individual's migration-timing
problem. In which case the necessary condition (11) indicates that at the optimum, the gains
from an infinitesimal delay of the migration from the optimal date in terms of the risk bearing
differential (the term on the right-hand side) are offset by the foregone expected income
differential (the first term on the LHS) and the foregone benefits from not starting the
assimilation process earlier (the second term on the LHS).
As intuitively expected, the necessary condition indicates that a higher degree of
absolute risk aversion postpones migration, whereas a longer life expectancy (T), i.e., being
young, encourages earlier migration. The former effect is due to the excessive variance income

in the place of destination as compared to that in the place of origin. The latter effect stems
from the fact that longer life expectancy enables a longer assimilation period and hence provides
the migrant with the ability to enjoy a higher income in the place of destination in a greater
number of points of time. Moreover, this effect is intensified if the initial assimilation costs (c)
were positively related to age and the assimilation speed ((3) were inversely related to age.
From the necessary condition (11) it is difficult to assess the effects of time preferences
and assimilation speed on the date of migration. However, the effects of these important
factors can be found for the special case where the individual is concerned with the well-being
of his/her descendants. In this case T (the planning horizon) goes to infinity and hence a
closed-form solution to the optimal timing of migration can be easily found:

t* = I 10

0.5R ( c l . a I )
- (^ d - c) -

cp

( 12)

c+p-=

Since the sufficient condition required that (o^ . o^) > 0, the interior solution to the migrationtiming problem presented in (12) indicates that for these far-sighted and altruist migrants
[(Ho * (M-d_c)J is positive. That is, these people are willing to migrate at some point during their
planning horizon although they undergo a reduction in their expected income and face a higher
level of uncertainty about their income at the place of destination at the short run. This
conclusion is compatible with Todaro’s (1969) assertion that "even if expected urban real
income is less than rural income for a certain period following migration, it may still be
economically rational from a longer-run point of view for the individual to migrate and swell the
ranks of the urban traditional sector." (p. 140) In contrast to Todaro's (1969) suggestion, the
individual must nei "balance the probabilities and risks of being unemployed or sporadically
employed in the city for a certain period of time against a favorable urban (modem sector) wage
differential" (p. 140), since in the present case migration is also justified by the reduction of the
assimilation costs for the individual's descendants. In that respect equation (12) shows that the
smaller the risk differential and the greater the initial expected income differential between the
place of origin and the place of destination, the earlier the migration date. Equation (12) also
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indicates that a strong time preference (r), a high assimilation speed (6) and low initial
assimilation costs (c) encourage earlier migration.

4.

CORNER SOLUTIONS TO THE MIGRATION TIMING PROBLEM
The sufficient condition for maximum expected utility also indicates that an interior

solution to the migration timing problem might not exist. In which case a corner solution is
obtained, that is the individual prefers either immediate migration or staying at his/her homeland
to migrating at any future date. These comer solutions occur when the individual perceives the
risk differential between the destination and origin to be non positive, and/or when he/she has
no time preference. In any of these cases the individual's decision to migrate immediately
(t*=0) vis-a-vis not to migrate during his/her lifetime (t*=T) is reached by comparing the
expected utility under these two alternatives. That is, t* is set to zero, or T, as [J(0) - J(T)] is
positive, or negative; respectively.
In the case where the individual perceives no risk differential between the place of
destination and at the origin

J(0) - J(T)
0

0
(13)

which implies that the individual migrates immediately if the sum of the expected discounted
income differential between the destination and origin exceeds the sum of the discounted
assimilation costs. Note that when the individual is myopic (that is r —»°°) and has no capacity
to adapt to a new environment (that is (3 = 0), immediate migration depends on positive
expected instantaneous income differential between destination and origin. Otherwise, the
individual prefers staying in his/her homeland to migrating. Equation (13) indicates futher that
the prospects of immediate migration decrease with the individual's capacity to adapt to new
environment and with the individual's life expectancy, and decrease with the individual's time
preference and with the initial assimilation costs. Of-course, in the special case where the
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individual perceives that

. o 2o < 0 , the likelihood of immediate migration is enhanced

further by the lower costs of risk bearing in the place of destination.
In the case where the individual has no time preference (r = 0)

J(0) - J(T)

= J [Hd - ce_Px -0.5R c j ]dx - (|i0 - 0.5R oJ)T
0
=

(W - (Io)T - 0.5R ( 0 2d - Cj2)T - 1(1 - e-PT).

(14)

Note that if the individual attaches a higher level of uncertainty to future incomes in the place of
destination, he/she would require that ^d exceeds
immediately.

ji0

significantly in order to migrate

The difference between (id and (Iq is necessary for compensating for the

excessive costs of risk bearing (the second term on the RHS) and for the assimilation costs (the
third term on the RHS) in the place of destination.

5.

TYPES OF MIGRANTS
While the mathematical presentation of the switch model assumes for tractability that the

individual's expected income in the place of origin is time-invariant, the discussion in this
section relaxes this assumption in order to describe different types of migrants. The following
discussion considers the life-cycle hypothesis that due to rising opportunity costs of investment
in human capital and because of deterioration of the stock of human capital, life-cycle earnings
of individuals rise with the individual's age and then decline near the retirement age and
conform roughly to an inverted U-shaped curve. (Modigliani and Ando, 1960; and BenPorath, 1967).
In accordance with the life-cycle hypothesis, the following discussion distinguishes
between three general types of migrants: 1) pre-prime-age migrants, 2) prime-age migrants,
and 3) post-prime age migrants. The position of each type of migrants is described in terms of
expected returns, risk, and costs of assimilation. Subsequently, the more likely solution to the
migration timing problem of each type is argued.
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Pre-prime age migrants: Since their employment career is not established, the income in the
country of origin of pre-prime age individuals is relatively low and is characterised by a
relatively high degree of uncertainty. Furthermore, the assimilation costs of members of this
group at a host country are relatively low due to: 1) their incompletely shaped personality
which helps them to accept new habits, customs and modes of behavior, 2) their young age
enables them to mingle and associate with their native counterparts through schooling, military
service, marriage, etc. Because of low foregone income in the country of origin, small risk
differential between destination and origin, and low assimilation costs in the country of
destination, pre-prime age individuals are endowed with a relatively high propensity to migrate.
For many members of this group the solution to the migration timing problem is interior. That
is, many of them delay migration in order to acquire minimal training necessary for being
admitted at the country of destination. Examples of pre-prime-age migrants are foreign students
and semi-skilled guest workers; and, in contrast, unskilled adventurers.

Prime age migrants: For individuals who are at their prime, migration is associated with
giving-up an established career in the place of origin that provides a relatively high income with
low level of uncertainty. Moreover, due to their advanced age, they are likely to be less open to
experience and adopt new habits, customs and modes of behavior, and are likely to have
dependents. Hence, they are prone to severe assimilation costs in the new location. Because of
both high levels of foregone income and certainty in the country of origin, and high assimilation
costs in the country of destination, people in their prime are characterised by a relatively low
propensity to migrate, and, in general tend to chose a comer solution to the migration timing
problem. That is, they prefer staying in their homeland, unless confronted with a very
attractive position abroad or with persecutions and catastrophes at home - in which case they are
likely to migrate immediately. Prime age migration is, on the one hand, the migration of very
special and high skill workers whose contributions are greatly rewarded abroad. On the other
hand, it is also the migration of the miserables — refugees.

Post-prime-age migrants: Members of this group are at the final stage of their employment
career. They enjoy a relatively certain income in their homeland, and assess the prospects of
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better employment abroad to be very low and the assimilation costs to be very high. Therefore,
their propensity to migrate is very low. In this stage of life, migration is motivated by nonpecuniary reasons such as living in a more favourable ecological environment, reunion with
family members, or fulfilling of cultural and spiritual aspirations. The solution to the migration
timing problem of invidivuals in these groups is likely to be interior. That is, migration to the
desired place is delayed to the retirement period and depends upon the transferability of the
pension payment to the place of destination and the sufficiency of the pension payment to
provide a decent standards of living.

6.

CONCLUDING REMARKS
The above analysis develops a switch model that determines the optimal time of

migration. The concepts of expected returns and risk differential between the origin and
destination, time preferences, risk aversion, and life expectancy serve as building stones of the
switch model. The novelty of the model is in its assumption that the decision on the migration
date takes into account an assimilation process which is represented by a cost function defined
on the time elapsed since migration. The existence of such an assimilation process implies that
the solution to the individual's problems of migration timing is not necessarily a comer one.
The model suggests that comer solutions to the migration timing problem occur only in the
cases where the individual perceives no risk differential between the place of destination and the
place of origin, and/or has no time preference. In any other case the individual delays migration
to a future date within his/her lifespan.
In accordance with the life-cycle hypothesis, three general types of migrants are
defined.

These are:

pre-prime-age migrants, prime-age migrants, and post-prime-age

migrants. The solutions to the migration timing decision problem of migrants of the first and
third types are likely to be interior, whereas that of the second-type migrants is likely to be a
comer solution.
In empirical studies on migration decision, disregarding any of the possible solutions to
the migration-timing problem might lead to undesired properties of the findings. In particular,
the possibility of interior solution to the migration-timing problem raises severe doubts about
the consistency of the estimated parameters of multinomial-logit analyses of current place-to-
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place migration. This is due, in terms of our switch model, to the fact that multinomial-logit
models are based on the assumption that the individual's migration-timing problem can have
only comer solutions. Since multinomial-logit analyses of current place-to-place migration
disregarded the possibility that some people delay migration to future dates, these analyses
understate the true number of migrants, especially when between-cohort effects are controlled
through the inclusion of age as an explanatory variable. And if we believe that destinationorigin expected income differential encourages migration and that destination-origin risk
differential and costs of assimilation deter migration, then multinomial-logit analyses tend to
understate the effect of destination-origin expected income differential and to overstate the effect
of destination-origin risk bearing differential and the effect of the costs of assimilation on placeto-place migration. These biases can be reduced by observing the individual's behavior during
a sufficiently long period which allows an interior solution to materialise.
The incorporation of assimilation costs that decline with the time elapsed since migration
can also provide an explanation to three interesting phenomena associated with migration. The
first phenomenon is that people migrate even though, in the short ran, they may undergo a
considerable reduction in their income and face a higher risk in the new location.
The second phenomenon concerns the structure of the migrant population. The first
wave of migrants consists of relatively young individuals endowed with high capacity to adapt
to new environment, whereas the subsequent migration waves are larger and more
heterogeneous with regard to age.

This phenomenon emerges from the high costs of

assimilation for early migrants which can only be paid by individuals endowed with long life
expectancy and high capacity to adapt. Kin relationship and ethnic bonds with veteran migrants
moderate the costs of assimilation for later migrants and hence also enable the migration of
older and less adaptable people.
The third phenomenon associated with migration is the solidification of distinct ethnic
groups in the place of destination. It is expressed in the forms of segregated neighborhoods
and countrywide ethnic federations which primarily serve to reduce the costs of assimilation.
In migrant societies the distribution of immigration dates and the population ethnic
structure have important welfare implications, one of which is the relationships among
immigration dates, ethnic composition, and income and wealth inequality. As indicated in the
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aforementioned studies on migrant-native-born income differential, in newly established
countries whose populations consist of immigrants from various places of origin (e.g., United
States, Canada, Australia, Israel, and many of the Latin American countries) it is plausible that
individuals who belong to a larger and more veteran ethnic group, ceteris paribus, are equipped
with better country-specific skills and hence have access to better employment opportunities.
There is a wide scope for future theoretical and empirical studies on the effects of ethnic
groups' organisation and lobbying on their members' initial costs of assimilation and speed of
assimilation, and on the allocation of immigration quotas.
Finally, the switch model developed in this paper can also be regarded as a general
framework to deal with other issues besides migration such as the optimal time to adopt a new
technology or to start a new career.
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